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Northern Ireland Assembly
ALEX SCHWARTZ*
Queen’s University Belfast
NILQ 61(4): 349–62
Rick Wilford astutely describes the system of government in Northern Ireland as“parliamentary life, but not quite as we know it”.1 Naturally, the “we” here refers to
those of us who are most familiar with the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy.
Undeniably, many of the features of the Westminster model are either absent or barely
recognisable in Northern Ireland.2 Perhaps most fundamentally, the “constitution” of
Northern Ireland does not concentrate public power in the hands of transient electoral
victors. Instead, the scheme seeks to include all major political factions within a broad
power-sharing coalition. Thus, in contrast to Westminster-style majority rule, most
commentators agree that the system of government in Northern Ireland is an example of
“consociational” democracy.3
One of the central elements of Northern Ireland’s consociational framework is the idea
of “cross-community support”. That principle has (at least) two dimensions. On the one
hand, the representational legitimacy of public authorities, ranging from the Police Service
of Northern Ireland, the Parades Commission, the Commission for Victims and Survivors,
to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, is frequently understood (or
contested) in terms of cross-community support.4 On the other hand, the idea of cross-
community support finds concrete expression in the decision-making procedures of the
Northern Ireland Assembly where, with respect to certain “key” decisions, cross-
community “consent” is a formal procedural requirement.5
* I am indebted to Moshé Machover, John McGarry, and Rick Wilford for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article.
1 R Wilford, “Northern Ireland: the politics of constraint” (2010) 63 Parliamentary Affairs 134, at 137.
2 Ibid. pp. 137–40.
3 See D Horowitz, “The Northern Ireland Agreement: clear, consociational and risky” in J McGarry (ed.),
Northern Ireland and the Divided World (Oxford: OUP 2001); see also R Taylor “Introduction” in R Taylor (ed.),
Consociational Theory (Oxon: Routledge 2009); and B O’Leary “The nature of the Agreement” (1999) 4 Fordham
Journal of International Law 22. For a dissenting interpretation, see P Dixon, “Why the Good Friday Agreement
in Northern Ireland is not consociational” (2005) 76 Political Quarterly 357.
4 See G Anthony “Judicial review in Northern Ireland: a guide to the ‘real’ devolution issues” (2009) 14 Judicial
Review.
5 Agreement reached in multiparty talks (The Agreement), Strand One, para. 5(d).
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The apparent “group-think” of the cross-community consent procedures would seem
to challenge the individualistic suppositions of liberal constitutionalism.6 The procedures
require that, upon taking their seats, members of the Assembly (MLAs) register a
“community designation” as “unionist”, “nationalist”, or “other”.7 When the cross-
community consent procedures are activated, designated unionists and nationalists enjoy a
potential veto power that designated others do not. Not surprisingly, the cross-community
consent procedures have been the subject of vociferous criticism, not only from the
academic community,8 but also from the Alliance Party, which, as designated others, argues
that the procedures unfairly discriminate against it.9 In effect, so the argument goes, the
procedures make it “more rewarding to be a member of one of the two named national
communities”.10
As we shall see, there is some basis to this line of criticism. Thus far, however, the
debate about the cross-community consent procedures has transpired at a very general level.
I hope to advance the conversation here by showing precisely how the procedures impact
voting power within the Assembly. This should help to correct vague notions about the
unfairness of the procedures. As we shall see, the critics overstate their case: in practice,
“others” are not necessarily any more (or less) disadvantaged than designated unionists and
nationalists. Moreover, I argue that cross-community consent is a valuable mechanism for
managing the constitutional politics of Northern Ireland in an appropriately non-
majoritarian way.
The unfairness of the cross-community consent procedures
The basic aim behind the cross-community procedures is to prevent a simple majority of
the Assembly from passing decisions without a critical amount of support from both
national blocs. Hence, certain key decisions, such as standing orders and budget allocations,
require either at least a majority of designated unionists and nationalists, as well as a
majority in the Assembly, or, in the alternative, a weighted majority of at least 60 per cent
of members present and voting, including at least 40 per cent each of designated unionists
and nationalists present and voting.11 Moreover, any Assembly decision may be subjected
to the cross-community consent rules where a “Petition of Concern” is brought by at least
30 MLAs.12
Arguably, the cross-community decision procedures protect each community from
being politically dominated by the other. But even if one grants that unionists and
nationalists ought to enjoy some kind of counter-majoritarian protection against each other,
the cross-community procedures paradoxically appear to purchase that protection at the
expense of those who do not identify with either community. As Rick Wilford argues:
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6 See I O’Flynn, “The problem of recognising individual and national identities: a liberal critique of the Belfast
Agreement” (2003) 6 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 129. On the general tension
between liberal constitutionalism and group-rights, see J Habermas, “Struggles for recognition in the
democratic constitutional state” in A Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition
(Princeton: Princeton UP 1994).
7 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 4(5).
8 See, for example, Wilford, “Northern Ireland”, n. 1 above; D Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland
Agreement: the sources of an unlikely constitutional consensus” (2002) 32 British Journal of Political Science 193;
and O’Flynn, “The problem”, n. 6 above.
9 Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Submission to the NI Assembly Voting System and MLA Designations –
Review 1/11/2001.
10 O’Flynn, “The problem”, n. 6 above, p. 144.
11 See Northern Ireland Act 1998, ss. 4(2A), 4(3), 4(5), 17, 28A(4(a)), 30, 39, 41 and 63(3).
12 Ibid. s. 42.
In effect, there are two orders of Assembly members: in relation to key decisions
there are those whose votes always “count” and those whose votes never do so.
Not only is this patently undemocratic, in the particular case of the Alliance Party
it is also richly ironic. Since its inception, it has been bi-confessional and
committed to the promotion of positive cross-community relations and yet it is
a casualty of this anomalous and wholly unnecessary procedure which could
easily be surrendered in favour of weighted majority voting on key issues.13
Intuitively, this does seem unfair. But we need to be careful about drawing hasty or general
conclusions here. Critics tend to overstate the differential impact of the procedures on
designated others. Wilford, for one, certainly gives the wrong impression when he says that
the votes of others never count. In fact, the votes of others always count – they count towards
the majority (or supermajority) threshold. Similarly, Ian O’Flynn argues that “in practice the
parallel consent rule implies that once a majority is secured within the assembly, the ‘others’
no longer count; at such a point, all that matters is whether or not there is a majority within
both communities”.14 Again, this is a very misleading way of characterising the cross-
community consent procedures. It is true that once a majority is secured in a cross-community
vote, the votes of others no longer count. But it is equally true that under a simple-majority
decision the votes of others do not count once a majority is otherwise secured.
Perhaps what critics like Wilford and O’Flynn really mean to say is that the votes of
designated unionists and nationalists are more decisive than the votes of designated others.
This much is suggested by the Alliance Party in its 2001 submissions to the Review of the
Northern Ireland Assembly.15 As the Alliance Party points out, the cross-community
consent procedures effectively count the votes of designated unionists and designated
nationalists twice – first with respect to the overall threshold in the Assembly, and again with
respect to the community designation thresholds.16 So, in so far as the votes of others may
be necessary to meet the majority or supermajority thresholds, their votes are not, strictly
speaking, irrelevant. However, on a cross-community vote, the votes of designated
unionists and nationalists are more likely than the votes of others to have a determinative
effect on the outcome. This line of argument, at least, suggests a more precise way of
formulating the problem.
The disadvantage suffered by designated others, understood in terms of the relative
decisiveness of their votes, can actually be quantified by calculating and comparing the
voting power of each party in the Assembly on a simple-majority decision against their
respective voting power under the cross-community consent procedures. As we shall see,
such an analysis substantiates, in mathematical terms, the moral intuition that the cross-
community rules are unfair to others. But the same analysis also reveals that the rules do not
unfairly disadvantage others vis-à-vis unionists and nationalists per se. Rather, the cross-
community rules tend to enhance the voting power of the two largest community
designation parties at the expense of all other parties, including the smaller community
designation parties. In other words, the rules tend to be unfair to smaller parties, regardless
of community designation. Moreover, designated others are not necessarily the most
disadvantaged by the cross-community consent procedures – on occasion the rules can be
even more unfair to smaller community designation parties.
How unfair is cross-community consent?
13 Wilford, “Northern Ireland”, n. 1 above, p. 139.
14 O’Flynn, “The problem”, n. 6 above, p. 144.
15 Alliance Party, Submission, n. 9 above.
16 Ibid. para. 2.2.4.
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Measuring voting power
It is perhaps too optimistic to hope that real-world democratic politics will ever be perfectly
fair. From the outset, power relations tend to inhibit the realisation of free and equal
discursive engagement.17 But we can at least scrutinise the fairness of the procedures that
regulate politics. Here, we are specifically concerned with how the procedures in the Assembly
affect the voting power of its MLAs. This question is distinct from the actual voting power
of MLAs. To be sure, the Assembly’s procedures inevitably have an effect on actual voting
power, but they do not exhaustively determine it. The actual voting power of MLAs is a
much more complex question. It depends on any number of empirical factors, including,
inter alia, the diplomatic skill of individual MLAs, the compatibility and intensity of their
respective preferences, the particular issues that happen to dominate the agenda at a given
time, and changing party alliances and rivalries.18 Because the argument that concerns us
here relates to the fairness of the procedures themselves, we need only focus on that
element of actual voting power that derives solely from those procedures. In other words,
we are interested in a priori voting power – “the power that a member derives exclusively
from the decision rule itself ”.19
As Felsenthal and Machover explain, a priori voting power can be conceptualised in two
distinct ways. The first of these is what they call “I-power”: “a voter’s potential influence
over the outcome of divisions of the decision-making body – whether proposed bills are
adopted or blocked.”20 I-power is to be distinguished from what they call “P-power”: “a
voter’s expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning coalition under a
decision rule”.21 I-power understands voting in terms of the passage or defeat of bills.
Voting behaviour is therefore motivated by “policy-seeking”. Conversely, P-power
understands the outcome of a vote in terms of the distribution of some set of goods
(“transferable utility”) to be divided by the victors among themselves. P-power can be
measured by the Shapley–Shubik index, a type of voting power analysis derived from
cooperative game theory.22 The Shapley–Shubik index equates voting power with a voter’s
expected pay-off in a cooperative game where a fixed amount of transferable utility is to be
shared among victors of a winning coalition according to “a prior binding agreement,
arrived at through bargaining, and concluded in advance of the decision”.23 This game-
theoretic model of voting power may have some distinctive applications, but it is not
generally applicable to legislative decision-making.24 In such cases, voting is primarily about
determining a common course of action on behalf of a decision-making body.25 Collective
decisions of this kind may or may not have consequences that are intelligible in terms of
transferable utility.26 Since we are concerned here with how the rules affect the ability of
voters to influence the outcome of decisions in the Assembly (and not with the pay-offs
they might expect as a result), we will ignore P-power and concentrate solely on I-power. In
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 61(4)
17 See, generally, J Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (London: Heinemann 1984).
18 See D Felsenthal and M Machover, “A priori voting power: what is it all about?” (2004) 2 Political Studies 
Review 13.
19 Ibid. p. 14.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 LS Shapley and M Shubik, “A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system” (1954)
48 American Political Science Review 787.
23 Felsenthal and Machover, “A priori voting power”, n. 18 above, p. 8.
24 See ibid. p. 10.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. p. 12.
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what follows, all references to “a priori voting power” (or even just “voting power”) will
therefore refer exclusively to I-power and not P-power.
PENROSE AND BANZHAF
The a priori voting power of a voter in a decision-making body can be understood in terms
of the probability that the voter’s vote will be decisive in a binary decision (a “yes” or “no”
decision on a bill or motion). So understood, a priori voting power is measured by the
Penrose index (R). The Penrose index assumes that all possible divisions of “yes” and “no”
votes are equally probable. In other words, it is assumed that any voter is just as likely to vote
“yes” as to vote “no”, regardless of how the other voters vote. An assembly of n members
therefore yields 2n possible divisions of “yes” and “no” votes. Voter “a” is decisive in those
divisions where a’s vote could convert an otherwise winning coalition into a losing one or an
otherwise losing collation into a winning one. In such cases, a has a “swing vote”. The
proportion of all possible divisions in which a has a swing vote yields Ra:
Ra = a’s swing votes/2n possible divisions
Accordingly, Ra represents a’s voting power understood as the “a priori probability that,
in a division on a bill, the votes will be so disposed that if a’s vote were to be reversed then
the fate of the bill would also be reversed”.27
The Penrose index expresses a probabilistic measurement of voting power in absolute
terms. But for some purposes it may be useful to measure how much voting power voters
have relative to one another. Relative a priori voting power is measured by the Banzahf
index ($).28 $a is simply a’s proportion of all possible swing votes. Alternatively, if R is
known for all voters, $a can be easily derived from Ra as follows:
$a = Ra / (Ra + Rb + Rc + Rd )
It should be noted that, because the Banzahf index measures the relative share of total
voting power, the total $ indices of all voters will always equal 1. It should also be noted
that, while there is a relation between absolute and relative voting power, a gain or loss in
R does not necessarily entail a corresponding gain or loss in $.
Voting power simulations 
The following voting power analysis makes use of “simulations”. These simulations are
intended to illustrate the differential impact of the cross-community consent procedures.
They are not intended to accurately depict reality. Thus, the simulations make a few
counterfactual assumptions in the interests of simplicity. First of all, the Northern Ireland
Assembly has 108 members. This means that there are 2108 possible divisions. Calculating
the a priori voting power of each individual MLA in these terms is not only exceedingly
complicated; it is also of little value since it takes no account of MLAs being organised
along party lines. So, for the sake of simplicity (and a little realism), the following
calculations concern the voting power of parties (not individual MLAs), on the assumption
that parties vote as blocs. This is not an altogether unrealistic assumption.29 In any case, it
helps to simplify matters considerably. The simulations also treat all designated others as if
they formed a single party (the Others Coalition, or OC) and it is assumed that the Others
Coalition also votes as a bloc. This is less realistic. While the three parties designated as
How unfair is cross-community consent?
27 See D Felsenthal and M Machover, The Measurement of Voting Power (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1998), p. 40.
28 See J Banzhaf, “Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis” (1965) 19 Rutgers Law Review 317.
29 On intra-party cohesion and division, see J Tonge and J Evans, “Party members and the Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland” (2002) 17 Irish Political Studies 59.
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other currently holding seats in the Assembly – the Alliance Party, the Green Party and the
Independent Health Coalition – have worked together for some purposes under the
umbrella of the United Community Group (UCG), they are distinct political parties, each
with its own policy preferences. Nevertheless, since we are concerned here with the voting
power of designated others qua others, it helps to imagine the others as forming a cohesive
coalition. This allows us to conceptualise their collective voting power vis-à-vis the
collective voting power of designated unionist and nationalist parties. A final simplification
here is the exclusion of the independent unionists from the simulations. This undoubtedly
distorts the results, since even a single seat can be a decisive vote on occasion. But the
addition of n parties increases the possible divisions by 2n without necessarily helping to
illuminate the fairness of the decision rules in question. In the interests of simplicity then,
all simulations imagine that their are no independent unionist (or nationalist) seats. The
different decision procedures – simple majority, parallel consent, and weighted majority –
are respectively abbreviated as SM, PC and WM. The associated overall, unionist, and
nationalist quotas for each procedure are shown within “curly” brackets in the simulation
tables reproduced below.
Simulations A and B are very simple: in both simulations the Assembly is composed of
only three (imaginary) parties, the Unionist Party (UP), the Nationalist Party (NP) and the
OC. This yields 23 possible divisions (i.e. eight). In Simulation A (Table 1.1), the UP and the
NP each have 26 seats and the OC holds the remaining 56 seats. In Simulation B (Table 1.2),
the same three parties are in play, but this time each holds 36 seats in the Assembly.
The simulations help to illustrate a few mathematical rules that derive purely from the
operation of the cross-community decision procedures. In order to describe these rules, it
is useful to divide the Assembly into “sets”. So, let P be the set of all parties in the assembly;
P = {p1,p2…,pn}. Similarly, let U be the set of all unionist parties, let N be the set of all
nationalist parties, and let O be the set of all designated others. Finally, let C be the set of
all designated nationalists and unionists, such that C = U + N.
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Table 1.1: Simulation A
UP 
(26) 
NP 
(26) 
OC 
(56) 
Total votes 
(Us, Ns) 
Swing voters 
SM 
{55} 
Swing voters 
PC 
{55; 14; 14} 
Swing voters 
WM 
{65; 11; 11} 
Y Y Y 
 
108 (26, 26) 
 
OC UP,  NP, OC 
 
UP, NP, OC 
 
Y Y N 
 
52 (26, 26) 
 
OC OC OC 
Y N Y 82 (26, 0) OC NP NP 
Y N N 
 
26 (26, 0) 
 
OC - - 
N Y Y 
 
82 (0, 26) 
 
OC UP UP 
N Y N 
 
26 (0, 26) 
 
OC - - 
N N Y 
 
56 (0, 0) 
 
OC - - 
N N N 
 
0 (0, 0) 
 
OC - - 
Now, as Simulation A shows, under an SM decision rule it is possible for a party to be
a “dictator” (Rp = 1). Thus, because OC has a majority of seats in Simulation A, there is a
100 per cent probability that the votes of the OC will be decisive (Ro = 1). This illustrates
the general proposition that if p holds a majority of seats in the Assembly, then p is a
dictator. This proposition can be expressed as follows, where “sp” refers to the number of
seats held by any party p, and “sP” refers to the total number of seats held by all parties (P):
For any SM decision rule, sp > sP x 0.5 ¤Rp = 1
Under both of the cross-community decision rules, however, no party can ever enjoy
more than a 50 per cent probability that its vote will be decisive (Rp <_ 0.5) because no party
can ever form a winning coalition without the contribution of at least one other party
(nationalists cannot win without unionists; unionists cannot win without nationalists; and
others cannot win without some nationalists and some unionists). Thus, unlike the SM
decision rule, the cross-community decision rules preclude the possibility of a dictator. This
can be seen in Simulation A, where a winning coalition under the cross-community
procedures necessarily includes all three parties, and in Simulation B, where a winning
coalition necessarily includes at least two parties.
However, although the cross-community procedures require that a winning coalition
necessarily includes at least some unionists and some nationalists, there is no such
requirement with respect to others. Indeed, where the votes of others are not needed to
meet the majority threshold, the cross-community rules have the effect of reducing their
voting power to 0. This can be seen in Simulation B. There, the votes of the unionist and
nationalist parties are both necessary and sufficient to carry their respective community
quotas and both parties together have more than enough votes to carry the overall majority
quota (and even the overall WM quota). In other words, the votes of both community
designation parties are necessary and sufficient for any possible winning coalition.
Conversely, the OC is neither necessary nor sufficient for any winning coalition. The OC’s
Penrose index is therefore 0.
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Table 1.2: Simulation B
UP 
(36) 
NP 
(36) 
OC 
(36) 
Total votes 
(Us, Ns) 
Swing voters 
SM 
{55} 
Swing voters 
PC 
{55; 19; 19} 
Swing voters 
WM 
{65; 15;15} 
Y Y Y 
 
108 (36, 36) 
 
- UP, NP UP, NP 
Y Y N 
 
72 (36, 36) 
 
UP, NP UP, NP UP, NP 
Y N Y 72 (36, 0) UP, OC NP NP 
Y N N 
 
36 (36, 0) 
 
NP, OC NP NP 
N Y Y 
 
72 (0, 36) 
 
NP, OC UP UP 
N Y N 
 
36 (0, 36) 
 
UP, OC UP UP 
N N Y 
 
36 (0, 0) 
 
UP, NP - - 
N N N 
 
0 (0, 0) 
 
- - - 
The unfairness apparent in the above simulations can be quantified in terms of the
differential impact of the cross-community procedures on the possible voting power of
others. Although the procedures limit the possible voting power of all parties, the possible
voting power of others is limited to a greater extent. In effect, the procedures yield two
different voting power “ceilings” – one for unionists and nationalists (Rc <_0.5), and another
for others (Ro <_ 2.5). The difference between these two ceilings captures, in an abstract way,
the inherent unfairness of the cross-community procedures.
In practice, however, the effects of the cross-community decision procedures are
significantly more complicated. Simulation C helps to illustrate this point. Simulation C
contemplates an Assembly not unlike the one elected in 2007: the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP) has 36 seats, Sinn Féin (SF) has 28 seats, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) has
18 seats, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has 16 seats, and the hypothetical
OC has 10 seats. An Assembly composed of five parties (each presumed to vote as blocs)
yields 25 (i.e. 32) possible divisions (see Appendix A on page 362 below). The impact of the
PC rule is apparent (see Table 2).
The DUP has more than enough votes to carry the unionist quota of 28 and SF has
more than enough votes to carry the nationalist quota of 23. Moreover, both parties
together have more than enough votes to carry the SM quota of 55. Thus, out of 32
possible divisions, the DUP and SF have 16 swing votes each (SF’s vote is decisive whenever
the DUP votes “yes” and the DUP’s vote is decisive whenever SF votes yes). Hence, the
Penrose index for both the DUP and SF is 0.5, meaning that each enjoys a 50 per cent
probability that their vote will be a decisive one. Conversely, the other three parties are never
decisive (the Penrose indices for all three other parties is 0). Because the DUP and SF are
the only two parties to have any swing votes, their Banzhaf scores are 0.5 each, indicating
that each party enjoys 50 per cent of the relative voting power under the PC rule. In short,
the rule makes the DUP and SF “co-dictators” – the votes of both parties are necessary and
sufficient for the formation of any possible winning coalition. Conversely, the votes of the
UUP, the SDLP and the OC are all “dummy” votes – they have no decisive impact one way
or the other.
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Table 2: Voting power for Simulation C
Decision 
procedure 
DUP (36) SF (28) UUP (18) SDLP (16) OC (10) 
SM {55}      
swings 
Penrose (Ȧ) 
Banzhaf (Ȗ) 
18 
0.563 
0.33 
14 
0.438 
0.26 
10 
0.313 
0.19 
6 
0.188 
0.11 
6 
0.188 
0.11 
PC {55;28;23}      
swings 
Penrose (Ȧ) 
Banzhaf (Ȗ) 
16 
0.5 
0.5 
16 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
WM {65;22;18}      
swings 
Penrose (Ȧ) 
Banzhaf (Ȗ) 
14 
0.438 
0.41 
14 
0.438 
0.41 
2 
0.063 
0.06 
2 
0.063 
0.06 
2 
0.063 
0.06 
The results are similar under the WM rule. Once again the votes of both the DUP and
SF are both necessary and sufficient to carry their respective unionist and nationalist quotas.
However, the two parties together do not have sufficient combined weight to meet the
60 per cent WM threshold. For that they need to enlist the help of one (and only one) other
party. This gives the other parties some impact that they would not have under the PC rule
discussed above – out of 32 possible divisions, each of the other parties has two swing
votes each (a “yes” swing and a “no” swing) and their Penrose indices accordingly are 0.063
(as opposed to 0).
A comparison of the resultant voting power for each party against its voting power
under the SM rule shows that the cross-community procedures are not necessarily more
unfair to others.30 On the contrary, in Simulation C, the cross-community procedures are
equally unfair to the SDLP and the OC. Moreover, the procedures are even more unfair to
the UUP – it suffers the greatest total loss in both absolute and relative voting power. The
clear winner in the cross-community procedures is SF. Under the PC rule, SF is 14 per cent
stronger in absolute terms and 92 per cent stronger in relative terms (almost twice as
strong). Similarly, the weighted majority rule is fair to SF in absolute terms, but favourable
in terms of relative voting power. The results for the DUP are more ambiguous – under
both the PC and WM rules the DUP is weaker in terms of absolute voting power. But the
unfairness to the DUP in terms of absolute voting power is arguably counterbalanced by
its substantial gains in relative voting power – the DUP becomes 51.5 per cent stronger
under the PC rule and 24 per cent stronger under the WM rule.
Idiosyncrasies aside, the general point to take away here is that the cross-community
rules tend to be unfair to all smaller parties – nationalists, unionists and others alike. This is
not an accidental artefact of the particular distribution of party strengths in Simulation C:
it is a general feature of the cross-community consent procedures whenever there is a larger
unionist party and a larger nationalist party such that the larger unionist party’s voting
weight is sufficient to meet the unionist quota and the larger nationalist party’s voting weight
is sufficient to meet the nationalist quota. In all such cases, the cross-community decision
rules will be unfair to all other parties, regardless of community designation.31
The foregoing analysis identifies two aspects of the unfairness inherent in the cross-
community rules. On the one hand, the rules are specifically unfair to others in so far as
they impose upon them a lower ceiling of possible voting power. On the other hand, the
rules tend to be unfair to any smaller party, regardless of community designation. The
question to be addressed in what follows is whether or not this unfairness is mitigated by
other considerations.
Constitutional politics and super-legitimacy 
While the preceding discussion helps to clarify the unfairness inherent in the cross-
community decision rules, it also risks obscuring something important about those rules:
whether or not the cross-community decision procedures apply, the Assembly cannot pass
a motion or Bill without at least a majority of MLAs in favour of the same. Thus, the
legitimacy of any successful motion or Bill within the Assembly is always, at least partially,
How unfair is cross-community consent?
30 This assumes, of course, that a simple majority decision procedure represents an abstract or formal
benchmark standard of fairness. On that assumption, a party is treated “fairly” by a deviation from the SM
rule where its voting power remains the same. A party is treated “unfairly” if it suffers a loss in voting power.
A party is treated “favourably” if it gains in voting power.
31 Indeed, if the combined voting weight of the larger unionist party and the largest nationalist party is also
greater than or equal to the overall quota for the decision procedure in question, then the Penrose and Banzhaf
indices for all other parties will be exactly 0.
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derived from the consent of the majority. The difference the cross-community procedures
make is that certain decisions require a degree of “super-legitimacy” beyond that which is
conferred by an SM. So, whatever differential impact on voting power the cross-community
decision procedures may have, the procedures also have the more general effect of making
it more difficult to execute certain types of collective action.
It is not uncommon for some matters to be singled out and subjected to especially
onerous decision procedures. The quintessential example in constitutional law is, of course,
constitutional amendment. Typically, constitutions cannot be changed except by way of
some special amendment formula. Amendment formulae may variably require such special
measures as the approval of a super-majority in the legislature, the approval of consecutive
legislatures, or ratification by popular referenda.32 In federal systems, constitutional
amendment may also require the consent of some or all of the constituent territories.33 In
any case, formal amendment processes tend to have the general effect of making
constitutional change more difficult to realise than ordinary legislation.34
The justification for onerous amendment formulae is often explained in terms of
constitutional “pre-commitment”.35 The idea is that the “people” collectively bind
themselves to certain fundamental principles or rules so as to guard against the temptation
to depart from those fundamentals when subsequent events strain their collective
commitments.36 To be sure, the possibility of constitutional amendment allows that the
people may later resolve to alter their fundamental laws. In some cases, as Bruce Ackerman
argues, sustained and popular “mobilized deliberation” may even succeed in effecting
constitutional change without recourse to formal amendment procedures.37 But such
instances of “higher lawmaking”, whether by formal amendment or popular mobilisation,
occur “rarely, and under special constitutional conditions”.38 In contrast to the everyday
politics of ordinary lawmaking, higher lawmaking is an extraordinary and onerous process,
the peculiar product of “constitutional politics” at exceptional “constitutional moments”.39
In a plurinational context, however, processes of constitutional change have an added
significance. As Sujit Choudhry explains, in multinational polities, “constitutional politics”
has two dimensions:
On the one hand, there is the sort of constitutional politics that presupposes the
existence of a national political community. But in parallel – and simultaneously
– multinational polities also engage in constitutive constitutional politics, which
concern existential questions that go to the very identity, even existence, of the
political community as a multinational political entity.40
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In such cases, processes of constitutional change are not neutral as between competing
substantive preferences.41 The processes themselves invariably reflect a particular
conception of the polity, one in which the power to effect constitutional change resides in
a single national demos or one in which constituent power is shared between multiple demoi.42
It is typical then for sub-state national groups to challenge monistic conceptions of the
polity and insist that the processes of constitutional change occur “on the basis of parity
between or among national societies within the state, particularly where rights or
prerogatives of the sub-state society are affected by the constitutional changes in
question”.43 The image then is not of a single people deciding on a common set of
principles once and for all, but that of a plurality of “peoples” who continue to negotiate
norms of mutual recognition in perpetuity.44
Constitutional politics in Northern Ireland raises similar constitutive issues concerning
the identity of the polity and constitutional change, but the challenges it poses are
significantly more complex. To begin with, the temporal border between regular politics and
constitutional politics in Northern Ireland is especially indeterminate – constitutionalism in
Northern Ireland is still very much “transitional” in nature.45 Thus, although the Belfast
Agreement provides a framework for managing the constitutive constitutional politics of
Northern Ireland in a peaceful way, it does not purport to finally resolve it.46 Instead,
constitutional change in Northern Ireland has been (and still is) an ongoing process in
which incremental changes, such as the St Andrews Agreement or the recent Hillsborough
Agreement, have played a critical role.47 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there is
no clear substantive border between regular politics and constitutional politics in Northern
Ireland. Alongside the high politics of Northern Ireland’s ultimate constitutional destiny,
there are a range of lesser issues that, although not constitutional in the strict sense,
nevertheless have an indirect constitutional significance in so far as they concern the
constitutional identity of the polity or the viability of its power-sharing style of
government. Thus, decisions concerning the public display of political symbols, the
composition of public authorities, the regulation of contentious parades, and the election
of the First and Deputy First Ministers all have a quasi-constitutional importance in
Northern Ireland that comparable decisions would not have in a more normal society. In
short, because there is no bright line between regular politics and constitutive constitutional
politics in Northern Ireland, the system of government is under a far-reaching and
seemingly indefinite burden to legitimate itself.
The cross-community decision procedures provide a way of managing the ongoing
constitutional politics of Northern Ireland by requiring a degree of super-legitimacy for
decisions of special constitutional significance. Indeed, the constitutional significance of
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many of the decisions to which the procedures apply is fairly obvious. Decisions relating to
the legislative competencies of the Assembly, the powers and number of ministerial offices,
amendments to standing orders, and amendments to the ministerial code have palpable
constitutional consequences – they directly concern the substantive or formal properties of
Northern Ireland’s devolved system of government. Other decisions have a less direct
constitutional significance. Budgetary decisions of the Assembly fall into this class.48 The
quasi-constitutional significance of such decisions derives from their connection to the
maintenance of a power-sharing system of government. The model of power-sharing
envisioned by the Agreement entails that the Executive will be inclusive of all major
political factions within the Assembly. It is further presumed (although not strictly required)
that the Executive will be led by a unionist–nationalist diarchy. In other words, it is part of
the very logic of the system of government that the Executive should enjoy cross-
community support. Thus, although budgetary decisions are not strictly speaking
constitutional – they do not affect the formal or substantive properties of the system of
government – a programme of government that did not enjoy cross-community support
would undermine the purposes of the constitutional settlement. The requirement that
budgetary decisions be passed on the basis of cross-community consent therefore provides
an extra guarantee that the system of government will not degenerate into unilateral
majoritarianism. Similarly, the requirement that a decision to exclude a minister or political
party from the Assembly be made on the basis of cross-community consent ought to be
understood in precisely the same way – as a safeguard against the erosion of inclusive
power-sharing.49
But, because the border between normal politics and constitutional politics in Northern
Ireland is porous, it is very difficult to identify matters of constitutional significance in
advance. This is why the Petition of Concern is important. Precisely because the Northern
Ireland Act does not specify any kind of restriction as to the subject-matter of the decisions
that may be the subject of a Petition of Concern, the procedure has proven to be a useful
device for identifying and managing matters of constitutional significance as they have
arisen. In some cases, the matters subjected to cross-community vote by Petition of
Concern have a fairly straightforward constitutional significance. Such cases have included
motions relating to the continuance of the institutions set up under the aegis of the
Agreement (the North/South Ministerial Council, the Civic Forum, the Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission).50 In other cases, the Petition of Concern has been used to
block motions relating to contentious issues that, although not of direct constitutional
significance, are nevertheless matters of constitutive constitutional politics. These have
included the display of Easter lilies within the Assembly, the flying of the Union flag from
Northern Ireland government buildings, the eligibility of footballers born in Northern
Ireland to play for the Irish Republic, the use of the Irish language in the Assembly, and
funding for Irish-medium schools.51 Admittedly, the Petition of Concern procedure is open
to abuse – MLAs can strategically activate the cross-community consent rules simply to
block ordinary legislation or motions that they are opposed to, even where there is no
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particular reason why the matter in question ought not to be decided by an SM vote. But
such cases have been the exception, not the norm.52
Conclusion: reform? 
It should be clear by now that the existing cross-community voting procedures entail a kind
of trade-off: super-legitimacy is obtained at the cost of some unfairness. This trade-off is
not, strictly speaking, a necessary one. As many critics (and even some supporters) of the
cross-community consent procedures have argued, the existing procedures could be
replaced by a “difference-blind” WM quota.53 In theory, WM quotas of 60 per cent or 65
per cent could guarantee a kind of de facto cross-community support but without recourse to
community designation. Thus, the unfairness to others within the Assembly would be remedied.
Nevertheless, I want to sound a brief cautionary note about the proposed reforms.
Voting power is very sensitive to the particular distribution of seats within the Assembly and
the adoption of different decision quotas can sometimes have counter-intuitive results. A
quota of 60 per cent may indeed entail that a winning coalition will include at least some
unionists and some nationalists. However, given the current make-up of the Assembly, this
is not a particularly “safe” guarantee of de facto cross-community consent. The 65 per cent
WM rule is “safer” in this respect, but it also poses a real risk of making the largest party a
quasi-dictator. In Simulation C, for example, without the DUP, the other four parties
together have 72 votes, just one vote more than the 65 per cent threshold of 71 votes. Thus,
an increase in the DUP’s strength by only two seats would make their votes necessary (but
not sufficient) to any possible winning coalition. In other words, the DUP would have a veto.
The community designation and voting rules are currently scheduled for review by the
Assembly and Executive Review Committee, at which time the merits of alternative
procedures are likely to be debated.54 The adoption of a 60 per cent or 65 per cent weighted
majority quota for key decisions would go some of the way towards alleviating the
grievances of the others. Moreover, as the foregoing analysis shows, smaller unionist and
nationalist parties also have an interest in reforms of this nature. Nonetheless, the existing
procedures have proven to be a valuable way of managing especially divisive issues of
constitutional importance. This value should be carefully considered before endorsing
reforms that may have unpredictable consequences for the rather delicate balance of power
in Northern Ireland.
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DUP 
(36) 
SF 
(28) 
UUP 
(18) 
SDLP 
(16) 
OC 
(10) 
Total votes 
(Us, Ns) 
SM 
{55} 
PC 
{55; 28; 23} 
WM 
{65; 22; 18} 
Y Y Y Y Y 108 (54, 44) — DUP, SF DUP, SF 
Y Y Y Y N 98 (54, 44} — DUP, SF DUP, SF 
Y Y Y N Y 92 (54, 28) — DUP, SF DUP, SF 
Y Y Y N N 82 (54, 28) DUP, SF DUP, SF DUP, SF, UUP 
Y Y N Y Y 90 (36, 44) DUP DUP, SF DUP, SF 
Y Y N N Y 74 (36, 28) DUP, SF DUP, SF DUP, SF, OC 
Y Y N Y N 80 (36, 44) DUP, SF DUP, SF DUP, SF, SDLP 
Y Y N N N 64 (36, 28) DUP, SF DUP, SF UUP, SDLP, OC 
Y N Y Y Y 80 (54, 16) DUP SF SF 
Y N Y Y N 70 (54, 16) DUP, UUP, SDLP SF SF 
Y N Y N Y 64 (54, 0) DUP, UUP, OC SF SF 
Y N Y N N 54 (54, 0) SF, SDLP, OC SF SF 
Y N N Y Y 62 (36,16) DUP, SDLP, OC SF SF 
Y N N N Y 46 (36, 0) SF, UUP, SDLP SF SF 
Y N N Y N 52 (36, 16) SF, UUP, OC SF SF 
Y N N N N 36 (36, 0) SF SF — 
N Y Y Y Y 72 (18, 44) SF, UUP DUP DUP 
N Y Y Y N 62 (18, 44) SF, SDLP, UUP DUP DUP 
N Y Y N Y 56 (18, 28) SF, OC, UUP DUP DUP 
N Y Y N N 46 (18, 28) DUP, OC, SDLP DUP DUP 
N Y N Y Y 54 (0, 44) DUP, UUP DUP DUP 
N Y N N Y 38 (0, 28) DUP, UUP DUP DUP 
N Y N Y N 44 (0, 44) DUP, UUP DUP DUP 
N Y N N N 28 (0, 28) DUP DUP — 
N N Y Y Y 44 (18, 16) DUP. SF — — 
N N Y Y N 34 (18, 16) DUP, SF — — 
N N Y N Y 28 (18, 0) DUP, SF — — 
N N Y N N 18 (18, 0) — — — 
N N N Y Y 26 (0, 16) DUP — — 
N N N N Y 10 (0, 0) — — — 
N N N Y N 16 (0, 16) — — — 
N N N N N 0 (0, 0) — — — 
Appendix: Simulation C
